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Items in bibliography identified by a string matching Toulmin

Denning11
.Open Denning11
 Peter J Denning
 The profession of IT: The Grounding Practice
  Commun ACM V54n12(Dec 2011)pp36-40
.See http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2043174.2043188
 =IDEA CLAIMS EVIDENCE ARGUMENTS DATA cf TOULMIN
 Grounded_claim::=`a claim accompanied by sufficient relevant supporting evidence`.
 Objective vs subjective evidence. 
 Also: plausibility, balance, commitment. 
 Need to provide more than objective evidence when an innovation may change the culture. 
 Some claims depend on community opinions. 
But beware `truthiness`.
 p40: Table describes the anatomy of a grounded claim. 
 Get into the habit of noticing what kind of grounds are presented when people present claims.
.Close

DuJingLiu12
.Open DuJingLiu12
 J Du J & S Jing & J Liu 
 Creating shared design thinking process for collaborative design
  Journal of Network and Computer Applications V35n1(2012)pp111-120
 =DEMO ENGINEERING RATIONALE TOOL TEAMTHINK S-DTPM cf COMPENDIUM IBIS TOULMIN
 Ideas about designs are issues, options, solutions, rules, criteria, and annotations.
 There are operations for sharing perspectives: Argument, evolution, association, fusion.
 Very weak evidence: one demo/case-study with 2 people.
.Close

GradonEtAl12
.Open GradonEtAl12
  Patrick Graydon & Ibrahim Habli & Richard Harwkins & Tim Kelly & John Wright
  Arguing conformance
  IEEE Software Magazine V29n3(May/Jun 2012)pp50-57
.See http://www.computer.org/software
  =IDEA ARGUMENTS EXPLICIT INFORMAL REASONS COMPLIANCE STANDARDS 
 Developers should explain why their software conforms to the standard. 
 Conformance arguments make the reasoning why the software meets the standard explicit: claims, strategies, contexts, evidence.
This exposes the developers' interpretation of the standard. 
 Mentions three notations/tools (from safety arguments) and figures show one. 
 GSN=Goal Structuring Notation. 
 CAE=Claims-Argument-Evidence.
.Box OMG Unifying these to give:
 ARM=Argumentation Metamodel,
.See http://www.omg.org/spec/ARM/
 SAEM=Software Assurance Evidence Metamodel (SAEM), 
.See http://www.omg.org/spec/SAEM/
  SACM= Structured Assurance Case Metamodel.
.Close.Box
.See http://www.omg.org/spec
 (dick)|- could use Toulmin,
.See http://csci.csusb.edu/dick/maths/notn_5_Form.html#Toulmin%20Arguments%20and%20Rationales
.Close

HaleyLaneyMoffettNuseibeh08
.Open HaleyLaneyMoffettNuseibeh08
 Charles B Haley & Robert Laney & Jonathon Moffett & Bashar Nuseibeh 
 Security Requirements engineering: A Framework for Representation and Analysis
 IEEE Trans Software Engineering  V34n1(Jan/Feb 2008)pp133-153
 =CASESTUDY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS METHOD  
 Describes a complex process and set of languages that work from security goals, to assets that are to be protected
(compare
.See [Stoneburner06]
), to requirements, thence to arguments for a particular system design satisfying the requirements, and so to the assumptions that can be rebutted, and the mitigation of the rebuttals and so forth.
 Security requirements are non-functional requirements and are closely related to the context of the machine being designed.
 Must expose assumptions about the machine and its context.
 Arguments that the system satisfies the requirements lead to lists of assumptions that can be challenged (WHY?) and rebutted.
 Rebuttals lead to mitigators that change the context and/or the requirments.
In turn the mitigators can be rebutted, and so on.
 Hence an iterative process making the design more secure.
 Uses Jackson Problem Frames
(
.See [Jackson95c]
.See [Jackson01]
), simplified
.See [Toulmin79]
arguments, Propositional logic, and a causal logic based on
 `Event1` shall cause `Event2`.
 Outer_argument::=`Formal logic showing the design satisfies the requirement and exposing assumptions`
 Inner_argument::=`Explores assumptions in terms of rebuttals and mitigators`.
 Process involves engineers and stakeholders in intense and fruitful discussion.
 (dick)|- Compare
.See [Lakatos76]
model of the mathematical process.  Also methods used to achieve safety.
.Close

Loui08
.Open Loui08
 Ronald P. Loui
 A Modest Proposal for Annotating the Dialectical State of a Dispute
 SCRIPTed  V5n1(2008)#176 
.See http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol5-1/loui.asp
 =ESSAY REBUTS Toulmin diagrams KISS RATIONALE
 
.See [ToulminRiekeJanik78]
 Just list the data for a conclusion underneath the conclusion
with the rebuttals etc ?(hidden) beside them.
 Or use a simple tree diagram: children support parents and rebuttals have a heavy horizontal link to what they rebut.
.Close

NuseibehHaleyFoster09
.Open NuseibehHaleyFoster09
 Bashar Nuseibeh & Charles B Haley & Craig Foster
 Securing the Skies: In Requirements we Trust
 IEEE Computer Magazine V42n9(Sep 2009)pp64-72
 =EXPERIENCE ITERATIVE FORMAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS ATC TOULMIN ARGUMENT PROOF RISKS SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE STAKEHOLDERS EXPERTS
 Advice: Exploit the experts. Exploit nonexperts. Scope the problems.  Iterate to mitigate. Formalize but also argue informally.
 Used 
.See [Jackson01]
for architectural models. Used Toulmin to structure arguments and rebuttals.
 Security requirements derived from protecting assets and challenging assumptions exposed by form proofs.
 Outer arguments on cover hidden assumptions, inner arguments rebut assumptions and lead to mitigation strategies or revisions of requirements.
.Close

Toulmin58
.Open Toulmin58
 Stephen Edelston Toulmin  
 The uses of argument.
  Cambridge [Eng.] University Press, 1958 BC177
 =THEORY INFORMAL LOGIC ARGUMENT RATIONALE
 Developed into text
.See [ToulminRiekeJanik78]
.Close

ToulminRiekeJanik78 
.Open ToulminRiekeJanik78 
 Stephen E Toulmin & Richard Rieke & Allan Janik
  An introduction to reasoning 
  Macmillan, c1979.  New York  BC177 .T59
 =TEXT INFORMAL LOGIC ARGUMENT RATIONALE GRAPHIC
 Based on
.See [Toulmin58]
 Toulmin_argument::=data "--->" O(qualifier) claim ", " warrant O(backing) O(rebuttal) .
.As_is         Backing
.As_is           | 
.As_is        Warrant 
.As_is           |
.As_is Data -------------> (Qualifier) Claim
.As_is                          |
.As_is                       Rebuttal
 Toulmin_argument::=following
.Net
 Claim::Utterance, conclusions
 Data::Utterance, facts
 Warrant::Utterance, general rule linking the data to the claim.
 Backing::Utterance, credentials when the warrant is not convincing enough.
 Rebuttal::Utterance,  restrictions which apply to the claim. 
 Qualifier::Phrase, possibly, likely, probably, certainly, presumably, necessarily.
.Close.Net
.But
.See [Loui08]
.See [HaleyLaneyMoffettNuseibeh08]
.Close.But
.Close

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