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Bibliographic Item (1.0)
- Frederick R Warren-Boulton & Kenneth C Baseman & Glenn A Woroch
- Economics of Intellectual Property Protection for Software: The Proper Role for Copyright
- StandardView V3n2(Jun 1995)pp68-78
- =STANDARDS COSTS ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS ONE-SIZE PROPERTY PATENTS COPYRIGHT
- software costs: fixed and sunk (inretrievable)
- USER: network externallities, sunk costs
- what is best for the public/welfare
- patent races
- copywrites on code - look&Feel disassembly etc?
- merger doctrine of function and form limits what can be copyrighted.
- vertical control =control over complementary products
- example: game machine vs games
- contracts tying buyer to get complementary products from "us" leads to antitrust moves.
- describes: developing a program as writing, testing debugging. money spent is not recoverable. reproduction is cheap
p71:" no hardware or software innovator cn achieve market dominance by merely launching a product, no matter how early it arrives in the market[...] or how large its sponsor may be[...] the efforts of many sponsors[users, developers, complementary developers, suppliers of substitutes]"
claims no reuse possible: " The cost usually has little value in other uses, and any learning acquired in the process can be applied only partially to other endeavors"
argues that copyright should not be extended to de facto standard.
- price management: users who need it more pay more, early adopters given price break to compensate for low network effect, product sold at low price but heavy users by complementary products
visicalc was first but not last spreadsheet.
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